Seventy-five Years of Data: Evaluating DHS’s Expanded Biometric Record

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is moving forward with an expansive new plan to collect and store biometric data, including facial scans, fingerprints, and voice patterns, from all foreign travelers entering or leaving the United States. According to The Wall Street Journal, DHS plans to retain this data for up to seventy-five years, creating long-term biometric files for millions of travelers. [1] Because biometric identifiers cannot be changed once compromised, privacy and cybersecurity experts have warned that large-scale biometric databases present especially attractive targets for hackers and foreign intelligence services. The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), for example, has cautioned that long-term retention of biometric data significantly increases the risk of misuse or catastrophic breach if systems are penetrated. [2]  Past breaches involving federal systems show the potential consequences of compromises involving sensitive personal data. Framed as a modernization effort intended to improve border efficiency and identify visa overstays more reliably, the initiative raises questions under U.S. privacy law, administrative law, and national security policy.

Under the expanded system, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers will use facial recognition technology at major ports of entry to verify travelers’ identities during both arrival and departure. DHS has used biometric tools for years, primarily fingerprints and photographs, but the new framework consolidates these data points and incorporates additional biometric categories. DHS has stated that these technologies are intended to support real-time identity verification, reduce reliance on manual document inspection, and decrease processing times for travelers moving through high-volume border checkpoints. [3]

The statutory foundation for the expanded biometric system derives primarily from post-September 11 legislation. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 directs the federal government to build an integrated entry-exit system that relies on biometrics to verify the identities of foreign nationals. [4] The statute also authorizes increased investigative staffing and the adoption of new technologies to strengthen border management capabilities. [5] DHS supplements this authority with regulations in Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations that allow the agency to determine the form and manner of biometric collection for immigration benefits, enforcement actions, and at ports of entry. [6] These combined authorities give DHS considerable latitude to expand and modernize biometric programs.

Federal data-management practices are also shaped by the Privacy Act of 1974, although the statute contains exemptions for national security and law enforcement systems. [7] Under the Act, DHS must publish notices explaining how the biometric database works, what information it collects, how long it keeps that information, and when it can be shared. These notices make DHS's plans public, including the fact that some types of biometric records can be kept for most of a person’s life. 

According to reporting by Angus Loten in The Wall Street Journal, DHS has identified several operational objectives for its expanded biometric initiative. First, automated identity checks make it harder for people to use fake documents or for someone who looks similar to pass through undetected. Second, by matching people as they enter or leave the country, DHS can more accurately track who overstays their visas, a major source of unauthorized immigration. DHS has also emphasized efficiency, noting that automated checks may reduce congestion at large ports of entry. [8] A centralized biometric system is intended to improve interoperability among DHS components further, facilitating coordination among CBP, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

As DHS increases its reliance on biometric tools, several questions have emerged among legal scholars, technologists, and privacy researchers. One area of discussion concerns the long retention periods associated with specific biometric datasets. DHS has explained that the extended retention of biometric data is useful for identity verification in cases where individuals interact with the immigration system intermittently over many years. [9] Cybersecurity experts have raised concerns about whether keeping this data for so long aligns with basic privacy principles and about how difficult it is to protect such sensitive information over many years. [10]

Cybersecurity is also a key issue in evaluating the expanded biometric system. Because biometric identifiers are permanent, the risks associated with unauthorized access differ from those involving traditional passwords or personal identification numbers. Experts have pointed to past federal data breaches, including the 2015 Office of Personnel Management incident and a 2019 breach involving a CBP subcontractor, as examples illustrating the potential difficulty of protecting large repositories of sensitive information. [11][12] As DHS collects more categories of biometric information and retains them for extended periods, cybersecurity standards and oversight mechanisms remain central to policy discussions.

Cybersecurity risks associated with biometric systems have already occurred in practice. A 2020 report by the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General reviewed a 2019 facial-recognition pilot run by Customs and Border Protection and found that a subcontractor improperly copied and stored traveler facial images on an encrypted device without authorization. The subcontractor’s network was later breached in a separate cyber incident, exposing sensitive biometric identifiers of approximately 184,000 travelers. [13] Biometric identifiers such as facial images and fingerprints, unlike passwords or identification numbers, cannot be changed once leaked. Once exposed, the risk persists indefinitely. Although the breach arose from a limited pilot program, it shows how failures in oversight can permanently expose sensitive data. 

Administrative-law questions have also been raised regarding how DHS implements biometric policies. Much of the operational framework for the expanded system arises from internal directives and System of Records Notices rather than formal notice-and-comment rulemaking. This is allowed under current law, but it means there are fewer chances for the public to weigh in or for courts to review these decisions. As biometric tools continue to evolve rapidly, how much discretion DHS should have and what procedural safeguards are needed remain key legal issues. 

Information sharing is another area drawing attention. DHS works with other federal agencies, state and local governments, and even some international partners for immigration and law enforcement purposes. The System of Records Notices explain when and how DHS can share biometric data, but many experts argue that these disclosures should be more transparent to the public to better understand the full scope of data sharing across agencies and borders. 

The Department of Homeland Security’s expanded biometric program represents a significant development in U.S. border-management practices. Supported by statutory and regulatory frameworks that grant DHS substantial authority to employ biometric tools, the initiative seeks to enhance identity verification, streamline entry-exit processes, and strengthen immigration enforcement. At the same time, long-term data retention, cybersecurity considerations, and questions of administrative oversight continue to shape ongoing discussions among legal and technical experts. As implementation progresses, these issues will likely remain central to evaluating how the biometric system functions and how it may evolve in the years ahead.

Edited by Ava Betanco-Born

Endnotes

[1] Angus Loten, Homeland Security Biometric Policy for Foreign Travelers Poses Data-Theft Risks, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 3, 2025), https://www.wsj.com/articles/homeland-security-biometric-policy-for-foreign-travelers-poses-data-theft-risks-83cb5603

[2] [8] EPIC Opposes Dangerous Expansion of Biometric Data Collection and Urges USCIS to Rescind Proposed Rule, Electronic Privacy Infromation Center (Jan. 8, 2026), https://epic.org/epic-opposes-dangerous-expansion-of-biometric-data-collection-and-urges-uscis-to-rescind-proposed-rule/

[3] Biometrics, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, https://www.dhs.gov/biometrics

[4] Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, § 302, 116 Stat. 543 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1365b).

[4] Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, § 302, 116 Stat. 543 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1365b).

[5] Id. § 101(a)(1).

[6] 8 C.F.R. §§ 235.1, 103.2(b)(9).

[7] Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.

[8] Loten, Homeland Security Biometric Policy, WALL ST. J.

[9] Biometrics, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, https://www.dhs.gov/biometrics

[10] Loten, Homeland Security Biometric Policy, WALL ST. J.

[11] Office of Pers. Mgmt., OPM Cybersecurity Resource Center: Cybersecurity Incident Updates (2015).

[12] U.S. Customs & Border Prot., CBP Statement on Subcontractor Data Incident (June 2019).

[13] U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Off. of Inspector Gen., Review of CBP’s Major Cybersecurity Incident During a 2019 Biometric Pilot (OIG-20-71, Sept. 21, 2020), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-09/OIG-20-71-Sep20.pdf