From January 2025 through February 2026, the Trump administration revived two statutes from the Early Republic as a tool to be used for an aggressive domestic immigration policy: the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 and the Insurrection Act of 1807. The Alien Enemies Act was formally invoked by President Trump on March 14, 2025 with the goal of summarily removing alleged Venezuelan gang members, and the Insurrection Act was repeatedly threatened for deployment where federal enforcement met resistance, most notably in Minneapolis. [1] The Alien Enemies Act was put into law during the 1798 Quasi-War with France and had only been used three times prior to the second Trump administration, all of which occurred during existential declared wars, namely the War of 1812, WWI, and WWII. [2] Its text is somewhat brief and shallow, permitting the arrest and removal of citizens of a hostile nation upon either a declared war or when an “invasion or predatory incursion” is perpetrated, attempted, or threatened “by any foreign nation or government.” [3] The specific phrase “foreign nation or government” is essential to interpreting the statute in the modern day, as it ties the law to the actions of traditional Westphalian sovereign states rather than nonstate actors, such as criminal organizations. The Insurrection Act is conditional in a similar way, allowing the President to deploy the military or federalize a state’s National Guard only against supposed insurrection, domestic violence, or unlawful obstructions that make it impracticable or difficult to enforce federal law through ordinary judicial proceedings, and only after a specific ordering of insubordinate participants to disperse. [4] Another relevant provision includes the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which bars the military from executing the laws except in cases where the Constitution expressly allows it or under specific Congressional authorization. [5] With the revival of these early republic emergency statutes, it is important to question whether their aggressive implementation crosses the threshold into blatant executive overreach. That line is crossed when statutory conditions such as “invasion” and “insurrection” are stretched beyond their text and historical context, bypassing traditional legal limits on deportations and spearheading enforcement faster than courts can review.
President Trump’s invocation of The Alien Enemies Act is a clear example of how emergency statutes can circumvent traditional judicial review. The President’s proclamation on March 14, 2025 declared that Tren de Aragua, a Venezuelan gang and designated foreign terrorist organization, was invading the United States, and directed the removal of Venezuelan citizens aged fourteen or older who were deemed members. [6] In the 2025 Supreme Court case A.A.R.P. v. Trump, the Court issued a preliminary injunction—barring removals and deportations under the Act—while litigation continued, ultimately concluding that the government’s deportation notices to detainees were inadequate and violated the right to procedural due process. [7] Following this, a divided Fifth Circuit panel in September 2025 concluded that the allegations regarding Tren de Aragua did not meet the threshold of national conflict relevant to the Insurrection Act, but that ruling was eventually vacated once the full court granted rehearing. [8, 9] On August 13, 2026, the case was dismissed as moot because the government had all three named petitioners removed via traditional immigration law and deportation proceedings rather than the Insurrection Act. [10] Judge Ho of the case went beyond this, arguing that the existence of an invasion relevant to the Act is a “quintessentially executive” question, rather than a judicial one. [11] All of this brings into question whether a criminal gang, such as Tren de Aragua, can meet the definition of an “invasion,” with this question remaining unanswered by the courts due to the dispute dissolving before a court could weigh in.
For the Trump Administration, Los Angeles in mid-2025 provided the ideal template for utilizing these Early Republic emergency statutes towards the strategy domestic-deployment. In June 2025, following widespread protests against workplace immigration raids and ICE presence, the administration nationalized and sent nearly roughly 4,000 California National Guard troops and around 700 Marines to Los Angeles. [12] It is important to note that the President relied on 10 U.S.C. § 12406, not the Insurrection Act, during his deployment of military forces to Los Angeles. In the 2025 case Newsom v. Trump, presiding Judge Charles Breyer concluded that the President’s armed deployment violated the Posse Comitatus Act by aiding immigration officers and initially ordered the National Guard troops returned to state control. [13] The Supreme Court reinforced this skepticism towards the President in the 2025 case Trump v. Illinois, deciding 6–3 that the President likely lacked authority to deploy members of the Illinois National Guard under § 12406, namely in how its reference to “regular forces” likely refers to the military, which is itself bound by the Posse Comitatus Act. [14] After this, Trump subsequently announced the withdrawal of and defederalization of state National Guard forces from the cities of Chicago, Los Angeles, and Portland. [15] Legal scholars note how the decision left only two options for the President: an assertion of inherent constitutional authority transcending explicit Congressional or gubernatorial permission, or an invocation of the Insurrection Act itself, which can override objections from state governors. [16] This crossroads proved extremely significant, as it framed the 1807 Insurrection Act as the Trump administration’s last remaining option as their eyes turned to Minneapolis under Operation Metro Surge.
Operation Metro Surge began in early December 2025, focusing on the Twin Cities of Minneapolis and Saint Paul and its large Somali community, with the Department of Homeland Security proclaiming it as the largest immigration enforcement operation of all time. [17] On January 7, 2026, an ICE officer shot and killed Renee Good, a U.S. citizen. [18] Eight days later, in the midst of rampant and widespread protests over the killing, President Trump threatened to invoke the Insurrection Act unless state officials acted to “stop the professional agitators and insurrectionists from attacking the Patriots of I.C.E.,” and within days of this demand around 1,500 active-duty U.S. Army soldiers stationed in Alaska were reportedly placed on standby for a potential deployment to Minnesota. [19, 20] On January 24th, 2026, a Border Patrol officer killed a second U.S. citizen, Alex Pretti, culminating in border czar Tom Homan announcing the end of Operation Metro Surge on February 12th, 2026 after roughly 4,000 arrests. [21] While President Trump never formally invoked the Insurrection Act, the threat of such loomed over state leaders, such as those in Minnesota, who began planning for how to approach the situation if it came. [22] It is doubtful whether the statutes of the Insurrection Act were ever truly met, as traditional and ordinary judicial proceedings were plainly functioning, as was seen with a judge ordering the return of detained five-year-old Liam Conejo Ramos and his father to Minnesota. [23]
Those defending the Trump administration offer several legitimate responses to this analysis. The President of the United States is historically entitled to deference when it comes to matters of national security and related judgements, and federal agents in some cases did face legitimate hostility, such as attacks or impediments during arrests or other immigration operations. [24] That being said, when analyzing the immigration enforcement operations of the current administration from January 2025 through February 2026, a viable evaluation of executive overreach can be derived. Firstly, there is an explicit mismatch in the predicate of these Early Republic laws when a statute written specifically for war—especially against another Westphalian sovereign state—or rebellion is applied to criminal activity, non-state actors (such as gangs like Tren de Aragua), or lawful domestic protesters. Secondly, when emergency statues are utilized as a means of avoiding specific procedural safeguards—such as the right to meaningful notice in arrests or the specific limits of the language of the Posse Comitatus Act—it is very specifically an act of circumventing the law rather than simply applying it to its full extent. All of this puts on display how the current administration has been testing out how much it can stretch these Early Republic statutes, as well as how our traditional checks on the executive worked imperfectly. Courts, state officials, and public pressure ultimately reigned in President Trump’s aggressive immigration strategy, not through any true structural or legal mechanism but rather through ad hoc litigation and mass political backlash. The most straightforward step for Congress would be to amend the Alien Enemies Act would be to explicitly denote that the only threats that would be grounds for the Act’s invocation are those coming from other Westphalian sovereign states, rather than non-state actors, terrorist groups, or criminal organizations. Alongside this, the Insurrection Act could be amended to allow Congress to watchdog its invocation. This could follow similar frameworks to the National Emergencies Act and the War Powers Resolution, both couple executive flexibility to enforce the law as well as offering an off-ramp at the discretion of Congress. [25] These reforms would serve to preserve the flexibility of these acts, as well as reigning in some of the possible implementations that bring into question the issue of executive overreach.
Edited by Camilla Cardozo
Endnotes
[1] Proclamation No. 10903, “Invocation of the Alien Enemies Act Regarding the Invasion of the United States by Tren de Aragua,” 90 Fed. Reg. 13033 (Mar. 20, 2025).
[2] “Trump Cannot Use Alien Enemies Act to Deport Members of Venezuelan Gang, Appeals Court Rules,” PBS News, online at https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-cannot-use-alien-enemies-act-to-deport-members-of-venezuelan-gang-appeals-court-rules (visited October 14, 2026).
[3] Alien Enemies Act, 50 U.S.C. § 21.
[4] Insurrection Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–255.
[5] Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385.
[6] Gabriel Tynes, “Mootness Dooms Challenge to Trump’s Alien Enemies Act Deportations,” Courthouse News Service (Aug. 13, 2026), online at https://www.courthousenews.com/mootness-dooms-challenge-to-trumps-alien-enemies-act-deportations/ (visited October 14, 2026).
[7] A.A.R.P. v. Trump, No. 24A1007, 605 US ___ (May 16, 2025) (per curiam).
[8] “Trump Cannot Use Alien Enemies Act to Deport Members of Venezuelan Gang, Appeals Court Rules,” PBS News.
[9] “Appeals Court Dismisses Case Challenging Alien Enemies Act, Does Not Address Question of Trump’s Use of the Wartime Law,” ABC News, online at https://abcnews.com/Politics/appeals-court-dismisses-case-challenging-alien-enemies-act/story?id=135626524 (visited October 14, 2026).
[10] Tynes, “Mootness Dooms Challenge to Trump’s Alien Enemies Act Deportations.”
[11] Ibid.
[12] “SCOTUS Ruling Could Bar Trump from Deploying National Guard Back to L.A.,” San Francisco Chronicle, online at https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/scotus-could-bar-trump-from-deploying-guard-to-la-21261126.php (visited October 14, 2026).
[13] Newsom v. Trump, No. 3:25-cv-04870 (ND Cal Sept 2, 2025).
[14] Trump v. Illinois, No. 25A443 (US Dec 23, 2025), online at https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/25A443 (visited October 14, 2026).
[15] Brennan Center for Justice, “Trump v. Illinois: A Narrow Supreme Court Decision with Broad Implications,” online at https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/trump-v-illinois-narrow-supreme-court-decision-broad-implications-0 (visited October 14, 2026).
[16] Ibid.
[17] Rebecca Boone, “A Timeline of Trump’s Immigration Crackdown in Minnesota,” PBS News (Associated Press) (Feb. 13, 2026), online at https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/a-timeline-of-trumps-immigration-crackdown-in-minnesota (visited October 14, 2026).
[18] Ibid.
[19] “Minneapolis Shooting: Trump Says He Will Invoke Insurrection Act if Minnesota Politicians ‘Don’t Obey the Law,’” NBC News, online at https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/live-blog/minneapolis-live-updates-tensions-flare-federal-officer-shoots-man-dhs-rcna254161 (visited October 14, 2026).
[20] “Minneapolis Becomes Ground Zero in Trump’s Immigration Crackdown: Arrests, Protests and 2 Fatal Shootings by Agents,” CBS News, online at https://www.cbsnews.com/news/minneapolis-trump-immigration-ice-border-patrol-arrests-protests-shootings/ (visited October 14, 2026).
[21] Boone, “A Timeline of Trump’s Immigration Crackdown in Minnesota.”
[22] “Reckoning, Retribution and Resistance: The Behind-the-Scenes Story of Operation Metro Surge,” Star Tribune, online at https://www.startribune.com/reckoning-retribution-and-resistance-the-behind-the-scenes-story-of-operation-metro-surge/601583420 (visited October 14, 2026).
[23] Boone, “A Timeline of Trump’s Immigration Crackdown in Minnesota.”
[24] “Trump Threatens to Use Insurrection Act to Deploy Troops to Minnesota to ‘Put an End’ to Protests,” CBS News Minnesota, online at https://www.cbsnews.com/minnesota/live-updates/minnesota-ice-shooting-protests-trump-insurrection-act (visited October 14, 2026).
[25] National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1651; War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b).