The Limits of Judgment: West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish and the Revamp of the Court’s Judicial Philosophy

Few cases have dramatically altered the constitutional landscape as did West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, a decision that shifted the Court’s judicial philosophy and interpretation of due process. [1] Justice Holmes’ dissent in Lochner v. New York, [2] which advocated for majority rule in lawmaking, marked a watershed moment. [3] This philosophy subsequently influenced the New Deal era and helped reframe debates over substantive due process. During the early discussions of the Constitution, Alexander Hamilton outlined in Federalist No. 78 that the judiciary’s role encompasses “neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment.” [4] The Court’s judgment regarding due process would eventually expand beyond procedural guidelines to include substantive rights. Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s adoption of a progressive judicial philosophy in 1937, marked by the post-West Coast Hotel era’s deference to the legislature, fractured the historical unity between property and personal liberty, thereby leading to a broader, sometimes inconsistent, interpretation of substantive due process.

Modern jurisprudence often separates property and personal rights. However, historical precedent—from the Magna Carta to early state court decisions—viewed them as interdependent. The Magna Carta’s “law of the land” provision influenced the Framers’ intent to restrain legislative power. Hamilton, in Federalist No. 78, emphasized that due process protects individual rights and cannot be overridden by legislative acts. Hamilton further asserted that due process can “never be referred to an act of legislature,” providing compelling evidence that he actively disavowed legislative attempts to violate the foundations of a bill of rights. [5] James Madison’s phrasing in the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, echoing the Magna Carta, has been interpreted as offering broad protection for personal liberty. [6] In Trustees of the University of North Carolina v. Foy, [7] the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed that neither individuals nor corporations can be deprived of liberty or property without established legal rules. [8]The court’s chief justice, Thomas Ruffin, in Hoke v. Henderson [9] argued that private property must be protected even from the government. [10] Thus, the judiciary’s philosophy historically protected rights against legislative encroachment, extending those protections beyond mere procedural safeguards. 

In the antebellum period, state supreme courts expanded substantive due process to cover state regulations. Cases like Wynehamer v. People of New York, [11] decided during the early Prohibition era, struck down regulatory statutes on alcohol on substantive grounds, explicitly equating property rights with liberty and life. [12] Additionally, Chief Justice Greene C. Bronson in Taylor v. Porter [13] insisted that the New York constitution’s “law of the land” [14] phrase could not justify unjust statutes. [15] This consensus firmly linked constitutional protection of property with liberty. Furthermore, the longstanding tradition of preserving property rights is fundamental to understanding due process. In 1937, the Court faced a pivotal moment in its interpretation of due process.  The Lochner era upheld rights such as “freedom of contract” against legislative power; however, West Coast Hotel marked a shift toward judicial deference, recognizing broad legislative discretion in economic matters. This new philosophy displaced economic rights and, as scholars like Hugh Evander Willis observed, ultimately increased government power at the expense of personal liberty. [16] The shift culminated in the New Deal, with the Court upholding government spending and minimum wage laws, thereby overruling cases such as Adkins v. Children’s Hospital [17] and Morehead v. New York. [18] The majority in West Coast Hotel adopted a more egalitarian approach, reflecting Holmes’ critique of Lochner and emphasizing community interests. [19]

Yet, the philosophical shift post-1937 has sparked significant controversy by validating broad, unenumerated rights. Since 1937, the Court’s revision of due process became most evident in Griswold v. Connecticut, [20] which recognized “penumbral rights” under the Bill of Rights and intensified debate over the Court’s objectivity.  In Roe v. Wade, [21] the Court ruled that abortion was not only protected under the Constitution as a fundamental right, but that the Court’s “sweeping invalidation” [22] of Texas’s statute crossed a legal threshold that departed from the longstanding Hamiltonian framework. This emphasized that the judiciary should impose “neither FORCE nor WILL” [23] and never to “formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.” [24] While pre-1937 jurisprudence largely saw substantive due process as a safeguard for enumerated rights, the modern expansion of judicial deference to democratic interests has risked enabling legislative encroachment on individual rights. The erosion of economic liberty in favor of majoritarian values raises questions about the neutrality of substantive due process in contemporary contexts.

Supporters of modern substantive due process contend that the Court’s recognition of unenumerated rights in Griswold and Roe reflects a living Constitution that is responsive to contemporary values. This perspective maintains that the Constitution’s protections are not frozen in time, but should evolve alongside changing social norms and expectations. However, this approach risks conflating judicial interpretation with policymaking, undermining the judiciary’s impartiality. To mitigate the risk of judicial partiality, cases like Washington v. Glucksberg [25] establish a test for the Court to objectively adjudicate the issue of unenumerated rights by assessing whether they are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Landmark cases like Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization [26] reflect a reversion towards a narrower interpretation of substantive due process. While the post-Dobbs era imperils decades of legal precedent, the post-West Coast Hotel expansion of substantive due process has compromised the judiciary’s historical role as a guardian of liberty, blurring the constitutional boundary between safeguarding and manufacturing rights. Restoring a principled, pre-West Coast Hotel approach will help preserve both personal and economic liberties, maintaining judicial independence from majoritarian pressures.

Edited by Aryana Makati

Endnotes:

[1]  300 U.S. 379 (1937)

[2]  198 U.S. 45 (1905)

[3]  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)

[4]  Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 78, in The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: Signet Classics, 2003), 465

[5]  Ibid.

[6]  Stuart Leibiger, James Madison and Amendments to the Constitution, 1787-1789: ‘Parchment Barriers’, 59 J. of Southern History 441, 461 (1993).  

[7] 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 58 (1805).

[8] Ibid. 88

[9] 15 N.C.1 (1833).

[10]  Ibid. 12

[11]  13 N.Y. 378 (1856).

[12]  Ibid. 433-34

[13]  4 Hill 140 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843)

[14]  N.Y. Const. Art. 7, § 1

[15]  Ibid. 147

[16]  Hugh Evander Willis, The Doctrine of the Police Power (Indianapolis: Bowen-Merrill, 1907).

[17]  261 U.S. 525 (1923).

[18]  298 U.S. 587 (1936).

[19]  198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

[20]  381 U.S. 479 (1965).

[21]  410 U.S. 113 (1973)

[22]  Ibid. 173

[23]  Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 78, in The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: Signet Classics, 2003), 465

[24]  Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S. S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U. S. 33, 39 (1885).

[25]  521 U.S. 702 (1997).

[26]  597 U.S. ___ (2022).