At first glance, Quebec looks privileged. It is populous, wealthy, and geographically powerful. By law, a third of the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada must come from it. [1] But the reason those three seats exist tells a different story, one that begins with a political settlement in 1774 and runs through a Confederation whose later constitutional order Quebec never accepted.
Canada's legal system is split in two, between the French-style civil law of Quebec and the British-style common law of the other provinces. The split was created through a concession that began as colonial appeasement, granted to a conquered French colony to secure its loyalty, and has become an instrument of that province's continued subordination as much as it is the ground from which it resists. This article argues that the relationship between the two is best understood through the language of control and resistance.
After the conquest of New France, the French colony along the St Lawrence River, during the Seven Years' War, Britain tried to impose English law in Quebec and failed. The province's legal order proved too durable, or too difficult, to be reorganized. In 1774, the Quebec Act reversed course, restoring French civil law for private matters while keeping English criminal law for public ones. [2] While often described as a generous gesture from the Crown to its new subjects, this can be better viewed as a calculation. Britain was deeply in debt, and its most profitable colonies, the thirteen to the south of Quebec, were on the brink of rebellion. This placed Quebec's Catholic and seigneurial elites in a unique position. They had an obvious divergence from the interests of the British Crown, with whom they had just lost a war, as well as fundamentally different interests from the Protestant upper middle class that would lead the American Revolution. It was unclear with whom Quebec would side during the war, and so Britain bought their loyalty with concessions like the Quebec Act. Seen like this, it was less a gift from a gracious empire than a pre-war decision to divide potential enemies so that they could be better ruled.
In 1867, Confederation, the union of the first provinces into Canada, reproduced the same logic. Section 92(13) of the Constitution Act gave the provinces authority over property and civil rights.[3] Section 94 contemplated a uniform private law in the provinces but excluded Quebec entirely, and section 98 required that Quebec's judges be drawn from its own bar. [4] Each of these were a major victory for provincial autonomy, and in particular for Quebec and its special interest in that autonomy. But these weren’t rights that Quebec was allowed to give itself. The colony did not write the Constitution, but instead was controlled through it. While it is true that delegates and strong voices like George-Etienne Cartier, a lifelong fighter for the independence and autonomy of Quebec and Canada did take part in the negotiation, delegates like him were just one party among many, given the right to decide their future, but only with the acquiescence of the others at the convention, and ultimately of London. Quebec was allowed to help structure its judiciary, but it was not allowed to author it, and Quebecers were never put to a popular vote on the result.
Quebec does not hold its judicial autonomy through right. It holds it through grant, and Ottawa still appoints its superior court judges under section 96. [5] With each passage of law, it becomes increasingly evident that the external powers are the ones with the right to pass laws and rule on behalf of Quebec. Just because these laws favor Quebec does not mean that their writing doesn't take a certain autonomy from Quebec. In fact, the generosity of the law's terms acts to prevent and pre-empt the opportunity for opposition.
Quebec, however, did not idly receive its legal identity from the British metropole. The Civil Code of Lower Canada (1866) and its successor, the Civil Code of Québec (1991), are more than just technical legal documents. [6] In a civil law system, a code claims to be a complete, systematic, and self-grounding system: the singular document describing all there is to Quebec private law, resisting the incremental, precedent-driven, and sometimes inconsistent drift of common law systems. That system descends from the French tradition, from the Custom of Paris that the Quebec Act restored in 1774, and the Napoleonic Code that shaped the 1866 codification. It reflects what it is to be a Quebecer. In the act of applying the code, a civilian judge reasons from its text and its principles rather than an accumulating line of cases, with precedent built on judges appointed from afar. Each judgment reaffirms that the code built from Quebec and by Quebec is the basis of Quebec's private life, rather than excessive foreign jurisprudence.
This resistance continues to operate in public law. Quebec's National Assembly never consented to the Patriation of the constitution, the transfer of power to amend Canada's constitution from the British Parliament to Canada itself, in 1982. For much of the negotiations, Quebec stood with the other dissenting provinces against it. Then, on the night of November 4, 1981, known as the Night of the Long Knives, Ottawa and the other provinces struck a deal that left Quebec out in the cold as a lone dissenter. Patriation went forward, the Constitution was created, and in 1982 the Supreme Court held that Quebec had no veto over it, legal or conventional. [7] Quebec was bound to follow the rules of government that the other provinces created for it.
Quebec's response was to turn to section 33 of the Charter, the notwithstanding clause, which lets a legislature declare that a law will operate despite certain Charter rights, in renewable five-year periods. [8] Quebec applied it immediately to all of its existing statutes at once, and in Ford v Quebec (1988) [9] the Supreme Court upheld that blanket use as valid. More recently, Quebec invoked the clause pre-emptively in Bill 21 (2019). [10] There is an irony here. The clause was itself part of that 1981 deal that Quebec was excluded from. But despite its exclusion, Quebec can still use the tools of the deal that left it out, to take back some of the control that the agreement took from it. Quebec protects itself from the overreach of a federal order that, at a practical level, replaced the British as the main external power over the province, with an artifact of that very overreach.
Looking at these narratives of control and resistance side by side, we can see that the historical and the contemporary are the same story. The Quebec Act's calculated accommodation created an institutional model for how Quebec is still dealt with. Quebec is granted real concessions and does mount real resistance, but always within systems that it did not choose, systems that were created for it. Control and resistance are not opposites. Quebec is controlled through the very acceptance of its resistance. Each victory it wins, each concession it's granted, is on a terrain that reinforces the system it resists.
The 2014 Reference re Supreme Court Act shows how that extends today. [11] When Parliament tried to appoint a judge whose Quebec eligibility was contested, the Court held that the Quebec seats were constitutionally entrenched and could not be changed unilaterally. A guarantee rooted in the accommodation of 1774 was upheld as protecting Quebec's confidence in the Court. The Federal Law-Civil Law Harmonization Act (2001) did similar work at the federal level, expressing federal statutes in both legal traditions. [12]
This bijuralism is an accommodation. It allows Quebec to keep calling back to its French origins and institutions, but not to its independence. Bijuralism is a concession to the rights of the people of Quebec, but in conceding, it implies that the Canadian government holds the right to concede what was taken from Quebec in conquest. Quebec is given the right to three civil law justices on the Court, but there are always six more. Canadian federalism, on this reading, does not resolve the tension between the two systems. It manages it through institutional design: court composition, bijuralism, and constitutional carve-outs. The tension persists because it is productive and it maintains stability.
Read this way, the question of Canadian law becomes not “how should we accommodate Quebec?” but “why do we have the right to decide what Quebec deserves?”
These questions are live. The Supreme Court heard the challenge to Bill 21 and its pre-emptive use of section 33 in March 2026, and the judgment is still pending. Whatever the Court decides, the rest of Canada, through its institutions, will be setting the limits of the tool Quebec uses to protect itself. The question remains whether a federation, and a court two-thirds of whose members come from outside Quebec and all nine of whose members are appointed by Ottawa, should hold the last word on how Quebec resists.
Edited by Manuel Gomez
Endnotes
[1] Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, ss 5–6.
[2] Quebec Act, 14 Geo III, c 83 (1774).
[3] Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 92(13).
[4] Ibid, ss 94, 98.
[5] Ibid, s 96.
[6] Civil Code of Québec, CQLR c CCQ-1991, Preliminary Provision.
[7] Reference re Objection by Quebec to a Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1982] 2 SCR 793, 794.
[8] Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 33.
[9] Ford v Quebec (AG), [1988] 2 SCR 712, 714-715.
[10] An Act respecting the laicity of the State, SQ 2019, c 12.
[11] Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21, [2014] 1 SCR 433, 434.
[12] Federal Law-Civil Law Harmonization Act, No 1, SC 2001, c 4.