Buy now, pay later

The offer that greets millions of online shoppers at checkout is very simple, almost shockingly so: “pay in four interest-free installments.” Providers such as Klarna and Affirm let consumers split a purchase into four payments, typically with 25% due at checkout and the remainder due in equal installments every two weeks. Since federal law treats a loan repayable in four or fewer installments without a finance charge as outside the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), a lender can build a large business without providing the cost disclosures, ability-to-pay checks, and billing protections that attach to a credit card. I believe that the Congress should bring buy-now-pay-later (BNPL) lending under the federal consumer credit framework, with disclosure and underwriting standards changed to a product that charges zero interest. 

According to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), pay-in-four originations at six large providers rose from $2.2 billion in 2019 to $43.9 billion in 2023, and the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the research arm of Congress, estimates that originations reached roughly $63.3 billion in 2025. The average loan was small: $131 in 2023, which helps explain why the product can feel like a payment method rather than a debt [1]. In 2022, about 21 percent of consumers with a credit record used a BNPL loan, nearly two-thirds of loans went to borrowers with lower credit scores [2]. A large share of provider revenue comes from merchants rather than borrowers. Consider some of the leading companies in the field. Two years ago, the last year the data was available, in 2024, merchant transaction fees made up 57% of Klarna’s  revenue and 36% of Affirm’s net revenue [3]. 

TILA is organized around the concept of the “creditor.” Legally, a creditor is a person who regularly extends consumer credit that is repayable in more than four installments or that carries a finance charge[4]. The CFPB reiterates the threshold and stops a down payment from counting [5]. A pay-in-four loan sits just beneath the line with four installments, no interest, and late fees that Regulation Z does not treat as finance charges when they are imposed for an actual, unanticipated late payment [6]. The result is a lender that extends credit but is not a creditor, and accordingly is not required to provide the amount financed, finance charge, annual percentage rate, and total of payments that TILA requires for closed-end loans [7]. This line is also frankly arbitrary in function, since interest-bearing installment loans offered by the same firms are generally covered by TILA and a loan repayable in four installments isn’t [8]. The CFPB noted  in 2022 that BNPL marketing can make the loans appear to be a zero-risk credit option, and the CRS has described the product’s short, interest-free structure as a strategic advantage that has mostly helped it avoid regulations which would otherwise be applicable to traditional credit [9]. 

The CFPB tried to close the gap through interpretation rather than legislation. In May 2024, it issued an interpretive rule reasoning that the digital accounts consumers use to reach BNPL loans are credit cards under Regulation Z, which made their issuers card issuers that owe consumers periodic statements, dispute rights, and refund protections [10]. The theory relied on a provision of TILA that counts card issuers as creditors whether or not a loan involves more than four installments or not [11], and the rule proved fragile, and in May 2025, with the rule under challenge in federal court by the FTA, a fintech trade group caused the CFPB to withdraw it along with 36 other guidance documents[12].  

The CFPB’s finding that nine out of ten BNPL payments are made by debit card, so a payment pulled from an account with too little in it can trigger an overdraft fee that appears on no BNPL disclosure[13]. Stanford GSB analyzed banking data for 10.6 million American consumers and found that new BNPL users experienced rapid increases in overdraft charges and credit card interest and fees compared with nonusers [14]. Across the pond in England, economists found that some British consumers charged interest-free BNPL purchases to credit cards, which typically carry interest rates of approximately 20 percent [15]. Causation is difficult to establish, and the borrowers in these studies may have been under financial strain before they began using BNPL. But the studies point in a common direction: the visible price of a pay-in-four loan is zero, and the actual price is often paid elsewhere. Late fees, by contrast, are a shrinking part of the story, since 4.1 percent of pay-in-four loans were assessed a late fee in 2023, down from 5.2 percent in 2022 [16]. A rule exclusively focused on fees alone would miss the problem. 

The need for reform can be easily displayed with three reasons. First, the evidence is thin and aging. The CFPB’s most recent market report covers 2019 through 2023 and draws on six firms that responded to its market-monitoring orders, no agency maintains a central repository of BNPL data, and evidence shows that late payments among BNPL users have risen since 2023 [17]. Second, low default rates are not the same as affordability. The CFPB attributes part of BNPL’s lower default rate to automatic repayment [18], yet auto pay does not make a payment affordable; it determines shortfalls, which may be a bank account rather than a BNPL default. Third, the burden of reform is modest since underwriting already exists. Providers approve each purchase separately at checkout, often with a soft credit check [19]. The question is whether that underwriting must look beyond a single purchase, and if the industry is right that its product is safe, disclosure and credit reporting will cost little and the data will vindicate it. 

States have begun to fill the vacuum. California requires BNPL providers to hold a license, and in December 2025 seven state attorneys general sent information requests to BNPL providers [20]. New York has gone furthest. The New York Buy Now Pay Later Act in 2025  required a license, and on July 15, 2026, NY’s Department of Financial Services published implementing regulations for comment [21]. The proposal covers loans repayable in four or more installments, which closes exactly the gap that TILA leaves open. It would require pre-transaction disclosures that consumers cannot avoid and must acknowledge, cap most penalty fees at $8, and require “reasonable risk-based underwriting” that assesses at a minimum a consumer’s income and indebtedness [22]. The comment period closed on September 14, 2026, and the rules have not yet taken effect. A state-by-state patchwork, however, leaves consumers elsewhere with less protection and imposes costs on providers that operate nationally [23]. The United Kingdom has taken a national approach: since July 15, 2026, the FCA has applied its existing creditworthiness rules to interest-free deferred-payment credit, which is the British name for BNPL [24]. 

Congress should act in three steps. First, it should end the definitional loophole, The Buy Now, Pay Later Protection Act of 2025, introduced by Rhode Island Senator Jack Reed with a House companion from Deborah Ross in North Carolina, would define a BNPL loan as a closed-end consumer loan for a retail transaction that is repaid in not more than four interest-free installments and carries no finance charge. It would extend the periodic-statement, billing-error, and claims-and-defenses provisions that govern credit cards to those loans and place their providers under CFPB supervision [25]. Second, Congress should require a disclosure designed for a zero-interest product. An annual percentage rate of zero tells a borrower nothing, so a BNPL disclosure should instead state the total due, each due date, the amount of any late fee, whether autopay is required, and whether the loan will be reported to credit bureaus. That addresses both hidden costs and the common misunderstanding about credit reporting. New York’s proposal, which presents the disclosure before the consumer can proceed, shows that such a disclosure can be built into the checkout flow. Third, Congress should apply a proportionate version of the ability-to-pay rule that governs credit cards. Under a provision added by the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, a card issuer may not open an account or raise a credit limit unless it considers the consumer’s ability to make the required payments, based on income or assets and current obligations [26]. The same principle fits BNPL if it is scaled to the loan: a provider should consider a borrower’s income and existing obligations before approval, and should report loans to at least one national consumer reporting agency so that other lenders can see stacking. The first requirement without the second would ask lenders to assess obligations they cannot see. 

The debate over BNPL is often framed as a question of whether the product is good or bad for consumers. The problem with framing the debate so, is simply that this is the wrong question to be asking. Pay-in-four loans may well be cheaper than a credit card for many borrowers, but the law should not depend on taking the industry’s word for it. A product that originates an estimated $63.3 billion in loans a year, enrolls borrowers in autopay, and approves most non-ideal applicants is credit in everything but name. Bringing it under TILA, with disclosures and underwriting suited to its design, would let borrowers see what they owe and let regulators see what is accumulating, at a modest cost to providers whose products are as safe as they say. 

Edited by Jack Carreyrou

Endnotes 

[1] Nicolas Salem and Laura Udis, The Buy Now, Pay Later Market, 15 (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Dec 2025), online at https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_bnpl-market-report_2025-12.pdf (visited Oct 27, 2026) (reporting data from six large providers); Congressional Research Service, Buy Now, Pay Later: Policy Issues and Options for Congress, CRS Report R48858, “Growth in BNPL Usage and Size” (Feb 18, 2026), online at https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R48858.html (visited Oct 27, 2026) (estimating 2025 originations). 

[2] Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB Research Reveals Heavy Buy Now, Pay Later Use Among Borrowers with High Credit Balances and Multiple Pay-in-Four Loans, press release (Jan 13, 2025), online at https://www.consumerfinance.gov/archive/newsroom/cfpb-research-reveals-heavy-buy-now-pay-later-use-among-borrowers-with-high-credit-balances-and-multiple-pay-in-four-loans/ (visited Oct 27, 2026). 

[3] CRS Report R48858, “From Merchants,” n 71, citing the companies’ 2024 filings. 

[4] Truth in Lending Act, 15 USC § 1602(g). 

[5] Regulation Z, 12 CFR § 1026.2(a)(17)(i). 

[6] 12 CFR § 1026.4(c)(2). 

[7] 15 USC § 1638(a). 

[8] CRS Report R48858, “Truth in Lending Act” and “Firms That Offer BNPL.” 

[9] Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB Study Details the Rapid Growth of “Buy Now, Pay Later” Lending, press release (Sept 15, 2022), online at https://www.consumerfinance.gov/archive/newsroom/cfpb-study-details-the-rapid-growth-of-buy-now-pay-later-lending/ (visited Oct 27, 2026); CRS Report R48858, “Conclusion.” 

[10] Truth in Lending (Regulation Z); Use of Digital User Accounts To Access Buy Now, Pay Later Loans, 89 Fed Reg 47068, 47068 (May 31, 2024). 

[11] 15 USC § 1602(g). 

[12] Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, and Advisory Opinions; Withdrawal, 90 Fed Reg 20084, 20084 (May 12, 2025); CRS Report R48858, “Truth in Lending Act”; Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Buy Now, Pay Later (BNPL) Products, online at https://www.consumerfinance.gov/compliance/compliance-resources/consumer-cards-resources/buy-now-pay-later-bnpl-products/ (visited Oct 27, 2026) (noting the withdrawal of the 2024 rule). 

[13] Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Consumer Research Finds an Association between BNPL and Overdrafts, Take On Payments (Jan 17, 2023), online at https://www.atlantafed.org/blogs/take-on-payments/2023/01/17/consumer-research-finds-an-association-between-bnpl-and-overdrafts (visited Oct 27, 2026). 

[14] Ed deHaan et al., “Buy Now Pay (Pain?) Later,” 70 Management Science 5586, 5586 (2024). 

[15] Benedict Guttman-Kenney, Chris Firth, and John Gathergood, “Buy Now, Pay Later (BNPL)...On Your Credit Card,” 37 Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance 100788, 100788 (2023). 

[16] Salem and Udis, 11–12, 15. 

[17] CRS Report R48858, “Data Collection and Data Quality”; Wang, “BNPL Debt Outstanding.” 

[18] CRS Report R48858, “Consumer Debt,” n 110, citing Shupe and DeLuca, 4, 22. 

[19] CRS Report R48858, “Product Types.” 

[20] CRS Report R48858, “State Regulation.” 

[21] NY Banking Law §§ 736–747 (McKinney 2025); New York State Department of Financial Services, Regulatory Activity: Banking Law (updated July 15, 2026), online at https://www.dfs.ny.gov/industry_guidance/regulatory_activity/banking (visited Oct 27, 2026). 

[22] Buy-Now-Pay-Later Lenders, proposed 3 NYCRR Part 423, §§ 423.1, 423.9, 423.12 (New York State Department of Financial Services July 15, 2026), online at https://www.dfs.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2026/07/rp-bank-3nycrr-423-text.pdf (visited Oct 27, 2026); Steptoe LLP, NY DFS Unveils Proposed BNPL Regulations (July 2026), online at https://www.steptoe.com/en/news-publications/ny-dfs-unveils-proposed-bnpl-regulations.html (visited Oct 27, 2026). 

[23] Steptoe, “Takeaways.” 

[24] Financial Conduct Authority, PS26/1: Regulation of Deferred Payment Credit (unregulated Buy Now Pay Later) (Feb 11, 2026), online at https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/policy-statements/ps26-1-regulation-deferred-payment-credit (visited Oct 27, 2026); TLT LLP, Getting Ready for the FCA’s Buy Now Pay Later Regime (Feb 12, 2026), online at https://www.tlt.com/insights-and-events/insight/getting-ready-for-the-fcas-buy-now-pay-later-regime (visited Oct 27, 2026). 

[25] Buy Now, Pay Later Protection Act of 2025, S 3561, 119th Cong, 1st Sess §§ 2–3 (Dec 18, 2025); HR 6891, 119th Cong, 1st Sess (Dec 18, 2025). 

[26] 15 USC § 1665e; 12 CFR § 1026.51(a). 

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