For decades, Delaware has been the default legal home for American public corporations, anchored by the predictability of its Court of Chancery. Since 2024, a growing number have left, a trend commentators call DExit. Texas and Nevada have rewritten their corporate codes to attract them, which raises the question at the center of this article: are Texas and Nevada genuinely threatening Delaware’s monopoly? This article argues that they are, but only in one segment. The companies relocating are predominantly controlled companies, where a single person, entity, or group (the controller) holds more than 50 percent of the voting power for the election of directors, and the new codes compete with Delaware on two issues: how courts review transactions involving a controller, and how easily minority shareholders can bring derivative litigation. Delaware’s grip on the broader market looks intact. Its grip on controlled companies does not. Because minority investors bear the cost of weaker remedies, the question that matters next is whether the market prices that loss.
DExit began with one pay package. The modern DExit movement began in January 2024, when Chancellor Kathaleen McCormick of the Delaware Court of Chancery ordered the rescission of Elon Musk’s $56 billion compensation package, finding that his ties to the directors who negotiated it left no meaningful arm’s-length negotiation. [1] Following Musk’s public critique of Delaware’s judiciary, Tesla reincorporated in Texas that year. [2, 3] The Delaware General Assembly responded swiftly in March 2025 by introducing Senate Bill 21 (SB 21), which created statutory safe harbors for controlling stockholder transactions and restricted books-and-records demands. [4] The law effectively undid the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in In re Match Group, Inc. Derivative Litigation, which had required controller transactions to use both protections from Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp.: approval by an independent committee and a vote of the minority. [4] On February 27, 2026, the Delaware Supreme Court unanimously upheld SB 21 in Rutledge v. Clearway Energy Group LLC, holding that the safe harbors leave the Court of Chancery’s equitable jurisdiction intact and that applying them retroactively satisfies due process. [5]
The original grievance also faded. In 2025, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the rescission remedy in the Tesla case and awarded $1 in nominal damages. [6] Despite these judicial adjustments, the reincorporation wave persisted. For instance, Coinbase completed its move to Texas on December 15, 2025, [7] contributing to a broader trend in which approximately forty-nine Delaware public corporations submitted reincorporation proposals to their stockholders between January 2024 and March 2026. [8]
Texas and Nevada have aggressively competed for these companies by revising their corporate codes. In Texas, for example, Senate Bill 29 (SB 29), signed on May 14, 2025, codifies the business judgment rule and places the burden on the plaintiff. To overcome it, a plaintiff must plead with particularity that the breach involved intentional misconduct, fraud, a knowing violation of law, or an ultra vires act. [9] It also lets listed corporations set an ownership threshold of up to 3 percent of outstanding shares before a shareholder may bring a derivative suit, and it lets boards ask the Texas Business Court to decide in advance whether a committee’s members are independent. [9] That threshold has already been used. Southwest Airlines amended its bylaws two days after SB 29 took effect, and a court later held that a shareholder who owned 100 shares fell far below the threshold, which barred his claims. [10] Texas launched its Business Court in 2024, and Nevada, whose code was already more deferential to management, has advanced a constitutional amendment and a pilot program for a business court of its own. [11]
Reincorporation is gaining momentum, but it is selective, and the pattern points to who is leaving rather than how many. According to Glass Lewis, the 2026 proxy season yielded forty-four reincorporation proposals, a four-year high, with Texas the primary destination following Nevada’s lead in 2025. [12] Similarly, Benjamin Edwards, an associate dean for Faculty Research and Development at the William S. Boyd School of Law in Nevada, Las Vegas, counted forty-three proposals as of August, noting twenty relocations to Texas and fourteen to Nevada. Fifteen of the Texas-bound companies already have their principal offices in Texas. [13] Although shareholder approval rates remain generally high, they are far from guaranteed. While average approval was 83.2 percent, with only three proposals failing, outliers such as Archer Aviation, whose June 26, 2026 Texas proposal secured a mere 30.82 percent, fall far below that average. [12, 14]
The largest departures share a common structural feature. Data compiled by Analysis Group tracking corporate relocations in the first-half of 2026 indicates that a single stakeholder maintained majority voting control in several of the largest transactions. For example, Dell Technologies, valued at about $258 billion, redomesticated to Texas on June 26, 2026, securing 94 percent approval, with its founder, Michael Dell, controlling roughly 78 percent of voting power. [14] Similarly, Dream Finders Homes achieved 86 percent approval with its principal shareholder at 84 percent, and Voyager Technologies secured 71 percent with a 62 percent controlling block. [14] However, this dynamic is not universal; ArcBest successfully reincorporated with 63 percent approval despite its largest shareholder owning only about 15 percent. [14] When a controller holds that much of the vote, an approval figure measures the controller’s preference more than the view of minority holders. The failed proposals at Archer Aviation and Texas Capital Bancshares suggest that a move can lose without that backing. [CHECK whether either company had a controlling holder.] [12, 14]
The new laws point towards a unified objective: altering the standard of review for corporate governance disputes. Specifically, SB 21 reconfigures how courts review controller transactions, while SB 29 raises procedural hurdles for derivative litigation. Meanwhile, Nevada’s statutory framework maintains an even more pronounced posture of managerial deference. Collectively, these reforms reallocate legal risk when minority shareholders challenge insider transactions, without fundamentally changing day-to-day corporate operations. Delaware’s own legislative adjustments mirror this trajectory, as a ruling about a controller’s pay produced new statutory safe harbors for controller transactions. [1, 4] Consequently, this dynamic generates significant valuation implications for public investors. If minority holders lose remedies, rational markets should either depress share prices or price in compensatory mechanisms from controlling stakeholders. Whether that happens is an empirical question beyond the scope of this article, though an event study of announcement-date returns, split by whether the company has a controller, would test it.
Four counterarguments test that answer. The first is that the DExit phenomenon is overstated. Edwards has stated he does not see an imminent threat to Delaware’s dominance, expecting Texas and Nevada to function as meaningful alternatives rather than complete replacements. [11] This fits the answer above: a code aimed at one kind of company competes for a niche, and Delaware keeps the rest. The second objection posits that Delaware’s case law remains deeper. Foley & Lardner notes that Delaware maintains a decades-long institutional advantage in statutory interpretation, [8] while SB 29 dictates Texas courts are not bound by the judicial precedents of other states. Consequently, redomesticating to Texas requires forfeiting an established body of case law [9], a steep cost that should deter companies lacking a controlling stockholder, consistent with voting patterns in failed reincorporation proposals. The third objection suggests that many relocations merely reflect corporate headquarters logic. However, while fifteen of the twenty Texas-bound companies in Edwards’s tracking sample were already headquartered in Texas, this localized pattern does not account for the Nevada wave because those companies come from nine different states. [13] Finally, critics argue that the Court of Chancery overreached, and the Delaware Supreme Court’s reduction of the Tesla remedy supports that view. [6] Companies kept relocating following that reversal and following Rutledge, so it is difficult to credit any single ruling as the whole explanation. [5, 6, 14]
So are Texas and Nevada a real threat to Delaware’s monopoly? For controlled companies, yes. For other companies, the evidence so far is weaker. Delaware has spent two years addressing the problems that set off DExit, yet departures have continued, which suggests the legal fix was never the whole story. Three critical developments will determine the long-term trajectory of DExit: the initial rulings of the Texas Business Court applying the thresholds of SB 29, the practical implementation of Nevada’s business court amendment, and the 2027 proxy season, which will test whether companies lacking a controller can successfully secure reincorporation approval. Ultimately, the true test of DExit’s significance will be whether public investors who are systematically stripped of traditional equitable remedies receive adequate economic compensation in return.
Edited by Angela Xiong
Endnotes
[1] Tornetta v. Musk, 310 A.3d 430 (Del Ch 2024).
[2] “Elon Musk’s $56 Billion Tesla Pay Package Has Been Tossed Out by the Court,” Engadget, onlineat https://www.engadget.com/elon-musks-56-billion-tesla-pay-package-has-been-tossed-out-by-the-court-074235803.html.
[3] “Texas Sees Growing Benefit From Corporate Push to Ditch Delaware,” Bloomberg Law (September 9, 2026), online at https://news.bloomberglaw.com/esg/texas-sees-growing-benefit-from-corporate-push-to-ditch-delaware.
[4] Jones Day, “Delaware Supreme Court Upholds Constitutionality of DGCL Amendments Adopted as SB 21” (March 2026), online at https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2026/03/delaware-supreme-court-upholds-constitutionality-of-dgcl-amendments-adopted-as-sb-21; In re Match Group, Inc. Derivative Litigation, 315 A.3d 446 (Del 2024); Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del 2014).
[5] Rutledge v. Clearway Energy Group LLC, No 248, 2025 (Del Feb 27, 2026).
[6] “Delaware Supreme Court Reinstates Elon Musk’s $56 Billion Tesla Pay Package,” Drive Tesla Canada, online at https://driveteslacanada.ca/news/delaware-supreme-court-reinstates-elon-musks-56-billion-tesla-pay-package/.
[7] “DExit in 2026: The Reincorporation Question for a Venture Backed Startup,” The Innovation Attorney, online at https://theinnovationattorney.com/dexit-in-2026-the-reincorporation-question-for-a-venture-backed-startup/.
[8] Foley & Lardner LLP, “DExit One Year Later: An Assessment of SB21, the Continuing Pace of Reincorporation and the Maturation of Texas as a Corporate Domicile” (May 2026), online at https://www.foley.com/insights/publications/2026/05/dexit-one-year-later-an-assessment-of-sb21-the-continuing-pace-of-reincorporation-and-the-maturation-of-texas-as-a-corporate-domicile/.
[9] Bracewell LLP, “Texas Adopts Significant Pro-Business Corporate Law Reforms” (May 22, 2025), online at https://www.bracewell.com/resources/texas-adopts-significant-pro-business-corporate-law-reforms/ (visited October 16, 2026); Tex Bus Orgs Code §§ 21.419, 21.552.
[10] Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, “Ground Stop for Shareholder Derivative Proceedings in Texas,” online at https://hunton.sitepilot11.firmseek.com/insights/legal/ground-stop-for-shareholder-derivative-proceedings-in-texas.
[11] McDonald Carano LLP, “DExit: Can Nevada Replicate Delaware’s Corporate Edge?” (2026), online at https://www.mcdonaldcarano.com/news/dexit-can-nevada-replicate-delawares-corporate-edge/.
[12] Glass Lewis, “The DEXIT to Texas: US Reincorporation in 2026” (2026), online at https://www.glasslewis.com/article/the-dexit-to-texas-us-reincorporation-in-2026.
[13] Sasha Richie, “The Dexit Dilemma: How a Texas Business Phenomenon Could Reshape the Country,” Dallas Morning News (August 20, 2026), online at https://www.dallasnews.com/business/article/dexit-delaware-texas-nevada-corporate-governance-22372009.php.
[14] Analysis Group, “DExit Trends: Tracking Reincorporations Away from Delaware” (2026), online at https://www.analysisgroup.com/Insights/ag-feature/dexit-trends-tracking-reincorporations-away-from-delaware/.