BEYOND THE BAN: THE STRUGGLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMBATING ELEPHANT POACHING

Annually, a minimum of twenty thousand African elephants are slaughtered. [1] The killing of wildlife in the African continent for the purpose of supplying the ivory market has been an overlooked legal issue. In the eighteenth century, the elephant population in Africa may have been as many as 26 million elephants. [2] By the twentieth century, it was already estimated to be 10 million. The sharp decline is accounted for by the harvesting of the mammals’ tusks, which are collected for their ivory. Its leading markets are located on the Asian continent, some of which have banned its trade, but its occurrence has not been eradicated. 

There have been multiple international commitments and attempts to protect wildlife since 1973, so why has the issue not been remedied? 

Starting off in 1973, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) was agreed upon by the countries that are parties to the treaty. CITES is a global agreement made to control or ban the commercialization of endangered species; [3] it is legally binding, but does not replace local and national laws, being dependent on each compliant country to adopt their own legal mechanisms to achieve the agreement. It installs its control through the usage of permits and certificate systems to track the trade of the animals included in the document. [4] CITES offers a legal mechanism to control what species can be traded, and under what conditions. It is composed of a total of three appendices. The first one (I) encompasses species that are currently threatened with extinction and are or can be affected by trade, with essentially prohibited trade, with some rare exceptions that require an import and export permit. The second (II) includes those that are not at imminent risk of extinction, but could be in case their trade is not regulated, so their trade is permitted as long as it is not detrimental to the species. Finally, the third (III) is the case in which member countries ask CITES for help by regulating the trade of a species that is at risk in their own jurisdiction, but is not necessarily a worldwide trend, so trade is allowed as long as documentation proves the origin of the wildlife. 97 percent of the species mentioned by this institution are classified in Appendix II. By 1973, this legal framework included multiple species, including Asian elephants. In 1989, CITES was revisited during the seventh regular meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP7), leading to the decision to include the African elephant in Appendix I. [5]

CITES was crucial in the matter of creating a global ban on the ivory trade by including Asian and African elephants in Appendix I; controlling and monitoring wildlife trade, while using technologies like MIKE (Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants) to track data on the illegal poaching of those species. [6] However, it fell short in some aspects: for starters, its limited impact on domestic laws meant that the organization couldn’t prosecute or criminally penalize criminal organizations committing poaching; its only mechanism is commercial punishments, like suspending permits and certificates. The international nature of the organized crime of selling poached ivory surpassed CITES legal power, causing the need for additional international cooperations. 

In 2015, as a response to the massacre committed between 2010 and 2013, in which some studies estimate the killing of 100 thousand African elephants, [7] there was a UN General Assembly Resolution (69/314) that strengthened concerns about wildlife trafficking and implied more cooperation between signatories. In the preambulatory clauses, it mentioned “Expressing serious concern over … alarmingly high levels of killings of elephants in Africa, which threaten those species with local extinction and, in some cases, with global extinction.” [8] Indeed, from 2010 to 2014 the ivory prices in China tripled, making this illegal activity even more profitable and attractive. [9]

The UN's Resolution overcame gaps that CITES wasn't able to fulfill: the UN — differently from the agreement made in 1973 — has criminal punitive power, having stronger punishments than CITES solely commercial ones. Therefore, the UN is more efficient when it comes to addressing international organized crime due to its criminally punitive nature.  

There have been continuous international efforts to mitigate the issue, but it still remains. However, considerations have to be made with the bans that are already in place: they are more lenient in nature than one would expect them to be. For instance, as mentioned previously, 97 percent of the species on CITES are included in Appendix II, meaning that their trade is not banned, but rather controlled; so these animals’ derived products are still commercialized and exchanged for monetary reward. Not only that, but there were some flexibilizations of the treaty: in 1997 and 2000, some of the fauna contained in Appendix I were moved to II, including the Loxodonta Africana (African savanna elephant) in Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe (the forest elephant was kept in Appendix II). [10] This movement was based on the argument that the species’ community was stabilizing, and countries should have the right to profit from their wildlife to some extent through less restrictive trading laws, indicating tension between environmental preservation and economic interest. In 2008, there was the approval of a one-off sale of a government-held ivory stockpile from Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe to Japan and China, consisting of 108 tonnes of ivory sold at an average price of U$157 per kilogram. [11] It is said that the revenue was used to fund an anti-poaching project, although the exact percentage of revenue allocated to this end wasn't disclosed. But skeptics of the approval of the sale argue that this inflow of ivory into the market stirs demand, making poaching even more profitable, while also making it harder to distinguish between legal and illegal material due to an increase in its circulation. 

There is also a foundational consideration: all these global treaties lack global police force and the power to implement national laws in the signatory countries. Therefore, they rely on national enforcement and change in local laws. There is no way to force compliance, leaving it up to governments to decide how to comply. In addition, CITES and UN Resolutions act internationally, but don't control domestic trade of ivory in their member states. There is no way to overcome national sovereignty and define a universal ban on all ivory sales to, in turn, criminalize the slaughter of elephants. It comes down to national legislation and enforcement, which are further complicated due to other considerations: 

Ivory is still a valuable material. On the Asian demand side, the last reported value was $125 per kilogram (2024), and it is still a symbol of status and luxury. It is not unusual to find sculptures, chess sets, and even jewelry made from it. Moreover, it is used as part of traditional medicine in some areas of the world, being seen as the cure for ailments. [12] Overall, it is still a highly demanded good. Through the ban and regulations, it was made scarcer, increasing the prices for it, which consequently makes it more profitable to poach; illegal supply (which comes through poaching) has higher risks, thus even higher financial rewards. This increase in monetary value for the harvesting of elephants' tusks made it a more appealing market for criminal organizations. [13] Nowadays, the biggest markets are in Japan, Thailand, and illegally in mainland China. 

The considerations are not only economic; they overlap into social conditions that promote poaching in the supply countries. Illegal wildlife trade often occurs in locations with high biodiversity and economically vulnerable communities. [14] As mentioned, there is a high monetary reward involved in illegal hunting, and often, these economically vulnerable local communities are coerced by criminal organizations to provide them with the fauna and receive a reward. [15] International criminal groups fund local-level hunters, who are often people in disadvantaged communities, with poor education and chances of economic growth. [16] These groups take advantage of local communities' delicate position and their needs, such as keeping their properties and feeding their families. They offer a steady source of income to people in desperate conditions, establishing this asymmetric dynamic of power. Therefore, as long as people still rely on it for their livelihoods, a straightforward ban will not be enough. Social considerations are crucial to reduce illegal poaching, and job alternatives have to be considered in order to reduce this criminal activity. Alternatives, such as investing in economic activities that unite local communities and wildlife preservation, are needed to effectively diminish poaching's threat. 

All in all, it is possible to see how elephant poaching and the ivory market are multifaceted issues, unable to be solved by a straightforward ban. As long as ivory is still demanded, local communities are still vulnerable to being coerced by criminals, and the existing treaties offer loopholes and exceptions in which ivory is traded, poaching will continue to be a possibility for financial gain, perpetuating this long-existing flaw in environmental law. 

Edited by Camilla Cardozo


Endnotes:

[1] World Wildlife Fund, Stopping Elephant Ivory Demand, WWF, online at https://www.worldwildlife.org/our-work/wildlife/wildlife-crime/stopping-elephant-ivory-demand/, visited October 20th, 2026. 

[2] United States Government, African Elephant Conservation Fund: What We Do, online at https://www.fws.gov/program/african-elephant-conservation-fund/what-we-do, visited October 19th, 2026. 

[3] World Wildlife Fund, What is CITES?, WWF, online at https://www.worldwildlife.org/resources/explainers/cites/, visited October 20th, 2026. 

[4] United States Government, CITES, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, online at https://www.fws.gov/our-work/cites, visited October 18th, 2026. 

[5] Conference of the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), Trade in Elephant Specimens, Resolution Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP20), 2025, https://cites.org/sites/default/files/documents/COP/20/resolution/E-Res-10-10-R20.pdf 

[6] Wildlife Conservation Society, CITES CoP17: 7 Reasons Elephants Won at CITES, October 5th 2016, online at https://newsroom.wcs.org/News-Releases/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/9332/CITES-CoP17-7-Reasons-Elephants-Won-at-CITES.aspx, visited October 20th, 2026. 

[7] Brad Scriber, 100,000 Elephants Killed by Poachers in Just Three Years, Landmark Analysis Finds, National Geographic, August 18th 2014, online at https://www.nationalgeographic.com/animals/article/140818-elephants-africa-poaching-cites-census, visited October 20th, 2026. 

[8] United Nations General Assembly, Tackling Illicit Trafficking in Wildlife, Resolution 69/314, A/RES/69/314 (July 30, 2015), https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n15/238/62/pdf/n1523862.pdf 

[9] World Elephant Day, Why Care, online at https://worldelephantday.org/about/elephants/, visited October 20th, 2026. 

[10] Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), Elephants, online at https://cites.org/eng/prog/terrestrial_fauna/elephants, visited November 1st, 2026

[11] Dex Kotze, The Legal Racketeering of Ivory, Africa Geographic, September 23rd 2016, online at https://africageographic.com/stories/legal-racketeering-ivory/, visited October 20th, 2026. 

[12] International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), What Is Ivory? Your Questions Answered and Facts, June 4, 2024, visited October 20th 2026, online at https://www.ifaw.org/journal/what-is-ivory, visited October 20th, 2026.  

[13] Andrew Seguya, Rowan Martin, Nitin Sekar, Solomon Hsiang, Enrico Di Minin, and Douglas MacMillan, Debate: Would a Legal Ivory Trade Save Elephants or Speed Up the Massacre?, The Guardian, October 1st 2026, online at  https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/oct/01/debate-can-legal-ivory-trade-save-elephants, visited October 22th, 2026. 

[14] World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Wildlife Crime: Poaching, Trafficking, and Demand Explained, accessed November 2, 2026, online at https://www.worldwildlife.org/our-work/wildlife/wildlife-crime/, visited October 21th, 2026. 

[15] World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Wildlife Crime: Poaching, Trafficking, and Demand Explained, online at https://www.worldwildlife.org/our-work/wildlife/wildlife-crime/, visited October 20th, 2026. 

[16] Aubree Cosper, Poaching: Slaughter by Criminal Syndicates, SAFE Worldwide, online at https://safeworldwide.org/poaching-slaughter-by-criminal-syndicates/, visited October 20th, 2026.

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